Nigerian defence forces are preparing to launch a major military operation against Boko Haram. However, the security apparatus acknowledged that it does not have the capacity to engage in an operation against the Islamist insurgency group as well as effectively secure the planned electoral process.
Against that background, the electoral commission announced on 7 February that theseries of elections, which were initially planned to start on 14 February, would be postponed to commence on 28 March. Opposition parties have decried the decision, condemning it as a calculated response from a ruling party that finds itself in a difficult political position.
Perhaps the announcement of the proposed offensive - as politically opportune as it may be - also stems from mounting regional and international pressure to address the increasing threat posed by Boko Haram.
'There will be no foreign boots on the ground in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram.' For months, this has been the invariable answer of Nigerian authorities when offered help to tackle the group. Yet, last week, Chadian troops entered Nigeria from Cameroon and engaged in intense fighting with the militant group in the town of Gamburu.
Recent events in Nigeria indicate that Abuja's position has not deviated that much
Fighting took place just a couple of days after the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council authorised a revisited Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram at its 29 January meeting, ahead of the summit of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa on 30 and 31 January.
Although these developments were largely interpreted as a shift in Nigeria's foreign and security policy, a closer look at the situation indicates that Abuja's position has not deviated that much. The country remains reluctant to allow foreign intervention on its territory, and still aims to retain ownership and exert its leadership in any attempt to combat the terrorist group.
Granted, Chadian troops have entered Nigeria - but it was within the framework of a bilateral military agreement, not within that of a multinational force. As for the AU-authorised MNJTF, it will not be deployed in Nigeria, but along Nigeria's outside borders within neighbouring countries, with the aim of containing the terrorist group's regional expansion.
For those who continue to worry about the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls and other victims of terrorist acts perpetrated by Boko Haram, the details of the MNJTF deployment come as a major disappointment. The MNJTF appears largely out of sync with what would have been needed on the ground, in Nigeria, to eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram.
What would have been required, it seems, is a rather robust force such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been combatting al-Shabaab Islamists since 2007. The format of the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), which was established in 2011, could also have been envisaged.
Another model could have been the initial configuration of the African-led international support mission to Mali (AFISMA), in which the national army was intended to spearhead operations, with support from the African force, to recapture territory in northern Mali that was being controlled by a mixture of secessionist and jihadist armed groups.
Instead, with 'contingents deployed within their national territory,' the MNJTF is to be mandated to conduct 'operations aimed at preventing the expansion of Boko Haram, as well as other terrorist groups and eliminating their presence'. It also aims at facilitating 'the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of the affected countries'.
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